SECURITY-RELATED MONITORING WITH ZABBIX



Kaspars Mednis

ZABBIX Technical Support Engineer

ZABBIX 19 SUMMIT

SECURITY MONITORING – WHY?


Potential issues





Unnecessary open ports

Physical intrusions





WHY ZABBIX?

Zabbix is not a dedicated security monitoring tool.... but you can monitor the following







and much more......





WHY MONITOR CHECKSUMS?

Because it is the simplest way to detect changes to important files

works out of box very simple to setup efficient





HOW TO MONITOR CHECKSUMS?

Two types of checksums supported:

vfs.file.cksum[file] - calculates a 32-bit ckecksum (CRC-) vfs.file.cksum[/etc/passwd] = 1222364044



vfs.file.md5sum[file] - calculates a 128-bit MD5 hash vfs.file.md5sum[/etc/passwd] ₹b95899b886€3fffcff62x03b3cb37883bf93.75





CONFIGURATION ISSUES

Default configuration gives a lot of information And while it is very useful for deployment and troubleshooting....

It can contain known weaknesses
It can also give very valuable information to potential hackers !!!










HOW TO MONITOR CONFIGURATION?

You can monitor the content of a configuration file

vfs.file.contents[file] - returns back the content of a file

The most important parts of a configuration file can be monitored using dependent items.





ZABBIX EXAMPLE

	Wizard	Name ▲	Triggers	Key	Interval	History	Trends	Туре
	•••	Apache config		vfs.file.contents[/etc/httpd/conf/httpd.conf]	60s	0		Zabbix agent
	•••	Apache config: Apache server signature		apache.server.signature		90d		Dependent item
	•••	Apache config: Apache server tokens		apache.server.tokens		90d		Dependent item
Item	n Prepro	cessing						
	Prepr	ocessing steps Name	Parar	neters		Custo	om on fail	Actions
		1: Matches regular expression	▼ Serv	verTokens			✓	Test Remove
		Custom on fail Discard value	Set value	to Set error to ServerTokens Full				
		2: Regular expression	▼ Serv	verTokens\s+(.+)				Test Remove
		3: Discard unchanged with hearth	ea ▼ 360)				Test Remove
		Add						Test all steps
		Update Clone Check no	w Clea	r history and trends Delete Cancel				



RESULTS

Name ▲	Inter	Hist	Tren Type	Last check	Last value
Apache (3 Items)					
Apache config vfs.file.contents[/etc/httpd/c	60s conf/ht	0	Zabb	oix ag	
Apache server signature apache.server.signature		90d	Depe	ende 2019-10-10 14:39:	19 On
Apache server tokens apache.server.tokens		90d	Depe	ende 2019-10-10 15:14:	19 Full
Severity Recovery	time Status	Inf	fo Host	Problem	
High	PROBLEM	1	Test	Apache server tokens is no	ot "prod"





WHAT IF YOU ARE NOT A SECURITY EXPERT?



External programs can be used to check vulnerabilities




Output can be parsed, and useful information extracted



Triggers can be created to send out alerts



HOW IT WORKS





MONITORING USING SCRIPTS

Example of a security report

```
oot@ home]# nikto -o report.xml -C all -Tuning 9 -h <u>http://127.0.0.1/</u>
***** RFIURL is not defined in nikto.conf--no RFI tests will run *****
root@
 Nikto v2.1.6
 Target IP: 127.0.0.1
  Target Hostname: 127.0.0.1
 Target Port: 80
Start Time: 2019-10-02 18:45:26 (GMT3)
 Server: Apache
 Retrieved x-powered-by header: PHP/5.4.16
 Server leaks inodes via ETags, header found with file /robots.txt, fields: 0x3ce 0x593eb000cf4c0
 Allowed HTTP Methods: GET, HEAD, POST, OPTIONS, TRACE
+ Web Server returns a valid response with junk HTTP methods, this may cause false positives.
 OSVDB-877: HTTP TRACE method is active, suggesting the host is vulnerable to XST
+ 2121 requests: 0 error(s) and 5 item(s) reported on remote host
 End Time: 2019-10-02 18:45:32 (GMT3) (6 seconds)
+ 1 host(s) tested
```



HOW TO EXTRACT INFORMATION?

Use Zabbix built – in preprocessing



Regular expressions



SSON PATH



€ XML PATH




€ CSV to JSON



€ JavaScript




LLD PREPROCESSING POSSIBILITIES





DEPENDENT ITEMS EXAMPLE








CAN YOU DO SOMETHING WITH THIS REPORT?

[["niktoscan":{"nxmlversion":"1.2","options":"-o report.xml -C all -Tuning 9 -h http://127.0.0.1/myap <u>p</u>","version":"2.1.6","scandetails":{"sitename":"<u>http://127.0.0.1</u>:80/myapp/","targetport":"80","check s":"62","errors":"0","targethostname":"127.0.0.1","statistics":{"itemstested":"62","endtime":"2019-1 0-02 18:45:32","itemsfound":"5","elapsed":"6"},"item":{"999990":{"itemid":"999990","iplink":"http:// 127.0.0.1:80/myapp/","namelink":"http://127.0.0.1:80/myapp/","description":"Allowed HTTP Methods: GE T, HEAD, POST, OPTIONS, TRACE ","uri":"/myapp/","osvdbid":"0","method":"OPTIONS","osvdblink":"http:/ /osvdb.org/0"},"999986":{"itemid":"999986","iplink":"http://127.0.0.1:80/myapp/","namelink":"http:// 127.0.0.1:80/myapp/","description":"Retrieved x-powered-by header: PHP/5.4.16","uri":"/myapp/","osvd bid":"0","method":"GET","osvdblink":"<u>http://osvdb.org/0</u>"},"999967":{"itemid":"999967","iplink":"<u>http</u> ://127.0.0.1:80/myapp/","namelink":"http://127.0.0.1:80/myapp/","description":"Web Server returns a valid response with junk HTTP methods, this may cause false positives.","uri":"/myapp/","osvdbid":"0 ","method":"0FXMDQTR","osvdblink":"http://osvdb.org/0"},"999971":{"itemid":"999971","iplink":"http:/ /127.0.0.1:80/myapp/", "namelink": "http://127.0.0.1:80/myapp/", "description": "HTTP TRACE method is ac tive, suggesting the host is vulnerable to XST", "uri": "/myapp/", "osvdbid": "877", "method": "TRACE", "os vdblink":"http://osvdb.org/877"},"999984":{"itemid":"999984","iplink":"http://127.0.0.1:80/myapp/rob ots.txt","namelink":"http://127.0.0.1:80/myapp/robots.txt","description":"Server leaks inodes via ET ags, header found with file /myapp/robots.txt, fields: 0x3ce 0x593eb000cf4c0 ","uri":"/myapp/robots. txt","osvdbid":"0","method":"GET","osvdblink":"http://osvdb.org/0"}},"targetbanner":"Apache","target ip":"127.0.0.1","starttime":"2019-10-02 18:45:26","hostheader":"127.0.0.1","siteip":"http://127.0.0. 1:80/myapp/"}, "hoststest": "0", "scanstart": "Wed Oct 2 18:45:25 2019", "scanelapsed": "seconds", "scane nd":"Thu Jan 1 03:00:00 1970"}}



PROCESS THE REPORT USING LLD

Any JSON format data can be processed by LLD






LLD RULE DESIGN

```
'niktoscan": 🗆 🛭
  "options": "-o report.xml -C all -Tuning 9 -h
  http://127.0.0.1/zabbix",
  "wersion":"2 1 6"
   'scandetails": 🗇
      'sitename":"http://127.0.0.1:80/zabbix/",
     "targetport": "80",
     "checks": "62",
     "errors":"0",
     "targethostname": "127.0.0.1",
     "statistics": 🗆 {
        "itemstested":"62",
        "endtime": "2019-10-02 18:45:32",
        "itemsfound": "5",
        "elapsed":"6"
      item": 🗆 {
            "itemid":"999990".
            ipiink : nttp://i27.0.0.1:80/zabbix/",
           "namelink": "http://127.0.0.1:80/zabbix/",
           "description": "Allowed HTTP Methods: GET, HEAD,
           POST, OPTIONS, TRACE ",
           "uri": "/zabbix/",
           "osvdbid":"0",
           "method": "OPTIONS",
           "osvdblink": "http://osvdb.org/0"
            "itemid":"999986"
            "iplink": "http://i27.0.0.1:80/zabbix/",
           "namelink": "http://127.0.0.1:80/zabbix/",
           "description": "Retrieved x-powered-by header:
           PHP/5.4.16",
           "uri":"/zabbix/",
           "osvdbid":"0",
           "method": "GET".
           "osvdblink": "http://osvdb.org/0"
```

Discovery rule Preprocessing	LLD macros	Filters
	* Name	Vulnerability LLD
	Туре	External check ▼
	* Key	report.pl[lld]
*	Host interface	127.0.0.1 : 10050 ▼
* (Jpdate interval	1h
Discovery rule Preprocessing LLD ma	acros Filters	
Preprocessing s	teps Name	Parameters
	1: JSONF	Path ▼ \$.niktoscan.scandetails.item.*
	Add	
	Update	Clone Check now Delete Cancel
Discovery rule Preprocessing	LLD macros F	Filters
L	LLD macros LI	LD macro JSONPath
	{	{#ITEMID} S.itemid Remove
	A	Add
	U	Update Clone Check now Delete Cancel



LLD ITEM PROTOTYPES





ITEMS CREATED FROM THE REPORT

Wizard	Name ▲	Triggers	Key	Interval	History	Trends	Туре
•••	Vulnerability LLD: Vulnerability data: Vulnerability 999967	Triggers 1	vulnerability[999967]		90d		Dependent item
•••	Vulnerability LLD: Vulnerability data: Vulnerability 999971	Triggers 1	vulnerability[999971]		90d		Dependent item
•••	Vulnerability LLD: Vulnerability data: Vulnerability 999984	Triggers 1	vulnerability[999984]		90d		Dependent item
•••	Vulnerability LLD: Vulnerability data: Vulnerability 999986	Triggers 1	vulnerability[999986]		90d		Dependent item
•••	Vulnerability LLD: Vulnerability data: Vulnerability 999990	Triggers 1	vulnerability[999990]		90d		Dependent item
•••	Vulnerability data		report.pl[data]	1h	0		External check

Time ▼	Severity	Info	Host	Problem
2019-10-02 19:02:20	Warning		Test	Allowed HTTP Methods: GET, HEAD, POST, OPTIONS, TRACE
2019-10-02 19:02:20	Warning		Test	Retrieved x-powered-by header: PHP/5.4.16
2019-10-02 19:02:20	Warning		Test	Web Server returns a valid response with junk HTTP methods, this may cause false positives.
2019-10-02 19:02:20	Warning		Test	Server leaks inodes via ETags, header found with file /zabbix/robots.txt, fields: 0x3ce 0x593eb000cf4c0
2019-10-02 19:02:20	Warning		Test	HTTP TRACE method is active, suggesting the host is vulnerable to XST



WHAT IF THE SCRIPT TAKES TOO LONG TO EXECUTE?

Maximum execution time is 30s

00:30

In this case be used cron jobs or other scheduling mechanisms can





CAN WE MONITOR SERVICES OUT OF BOX?

Yes – using new Zabbix agent 1=60

Two new item keys supported

systemd.unit.discovery[<type>] List of systemd units and their details.

type - all, automount, device, mount, path, service (default), socket, swap, target

systemd.unit.info[<unit name>,,<interface>]
Systemd unit information

unit name - unit name

property - unit property (e.g. ActiveState (default), LoadState, Description)

interface - unit interface type (e.g. Unit (default), Socket, Service)



SERVICES MONITORING EXAMPLE

Item	Preprocessing						
	* Name Type	Systemd firewa	all status				
	* Key	systemd.unit.in	fo[firewalld	l.service]			Select
	* Host interface	127.0.0.1 : 100	50 ▼				
	Type of information	Character	•				
	* Update interval	1m					
				T .	-		
Nam		Interval	History	Trends	Туре	Last check	Last value
- oth	er - (1 Item)						
	emd firewall status emd.unit.info[firewalld.service]	1m	90d		Zabbix agent	2019-10-09 15:42:30	inactive





CAN WE MONITOR OPEN PORTS?

Yes, of course!

Zabbix can do it out of box



check open ports using **net.tcp.port[]** simple check



use discovery to scan your entire network for open ports



WHY WE NEED TO MONITOR OPEN PORTS?

Why do you need this?



Applications with weak security (telnet, ftp)




Unneeded applications with known vulnerabilities



Less open ports – more secure system



SIMPLE NETWORK DISCOVERY RULE







HOW CAN WE FIND HTTP ENABLED PAGES?

HTTPS is the recommended web protocol today

Open HTTP port does not mean the page is not redirected to HTTPS

How to check it?



check the response code

The <u>HTTP</u> response <u>status code</u> **301 Moved Permanently** is used for permanent <u>URL redirection</u>




WEB SCENARIO EXAMPLE

* Name	Zabbix HTTP page			
* URL	http://www.zabbix.com			Parse
Query fields	Name		Value	
	name	⇒	value	Remove
	Add			
Fallow or discosts				
Follow redirects		Body and headers		
	Body Headers E	Body and headers		
Retrieve mode	Body Headers E	Body and headers		



CAN WE FIND UNSECURE HTTPS PAGES?

You can use a webscenario to authenticate the certificate



verify that the *Common Name* field or the *Subject Alternate* Name field of the web server certificate matches the server name.



HTTPS CERTIFICATE VALIDATION

Scenario	Steps	Authenticati	on
	HTTP at	uthentication	None ▼
	SS	L verify peer	
	SS	L verify host	
	SSL	certificate file	my_secure_certificate.cer
		SSL key file	ssl_key
	SSL ke	ey password	supersecurepassword
			Update Clone Clear history and trends Delete Cancel





CAN WE FIND EXPIRED CERTIFICATES?

Community made externals cripts can be used to warn you about yourcertificate expiration

You can monitor (for example)









CAN WE MONITOR SNMP TRAPS?


Yes, using Zabbix SNMP trapper item

What to monitor?

- **EXE** Administrative logins
- Ports status up/down
- New devices (MAC security)
- Thresholds reached (Network attacks)
- Any other security related checks



HOW SNMP TRAPS WORK?







MONITOR YOUR ENVIRONMENT WITH ZABBIX








Door sensors

Motion detection sensors







WHY DO YOU NEED TO MONITOR LOGS?

A lot of security related information can be found in log files

For example





Elevation of privileges



LOG FILE MONITORING

Log files can be parsed to find important information
Dependent items can be created from log items
Triggers can be created to alert about serious security issues
Information from log files can be extracted and used in trigger names and tags

```
Oct 3 08:18:05 zabbix42 sshd[8103]: Failed password for root from 127.0.0.1 port 52684 ssh2
Oct 3 08:18:05 zabbix42 sshd[8103]: Connection closed by 127.0.0.1 port 52684 [preauth]
Oct 3 08:18:05 zabbix42 sshd[8103]: PAM 1 more authentication failure; logname= uid=0 euid=0 tty=ssh ruser= rhost=localhost user=root
Oct 3 08:18:12 zabbix42 sshd[8108]: Failed password for kaspars from 127.0.0.1 port 52694 ssh2
Oct 3 08:18:13 zabbix42 sshd[8108]: Failed password for kaspars from 127.0.0.1 port 52694 ssh2
Oct 3 08:18:13 zabbix42 sshd[8108]: Connection closed by 127.0.0.1 port 52694 [preauth]
Oct 3 08:20:11 zabbix42 sshd[8337]: Failed password for root from 127.0.0.1 port 52926 ssh2
Oct 3 08:20:11 zabbix42 sshd[8337]: Failed password for root from 127.0.0.1 port 52926 ssh2
Oct 3 08:20:11 zabbix42 sshd[8337]: Connection closed by 127.0.0.1 port 52926 [preauth]
Oct 3 08:20:22 zabbix42 sshd[8369]: Failed password for kaspars from 127.0.0.1 port 52960 ssh2
Oct 3 08:20:22 zabbix42 sshd[8369]: Failed password for kaspars from 127.0.0.1 port 52960 ssh2
Oct 3 08:20:22 zabbix42 sshd[8369]: Connection closed by 127.0.0.1 port 52960 [preauth]
Oct 3 08:20:55 zabbix42 sshd[8437]: Accepted password for kaspars from 127.0.0.1 port 53034 ssh2
Oct 3 08:20:55 zabbix42 sshd[8437]: pam_unix(sshd:session): session opened for user kaspars by (uid=0)
Oct 3 08:20:57 zabbix42 sudo: pam_unix(sudo:auth): authentication failure; logname=kaspars uid=1000 euid=0 tty=/dev/pts/3 ruser=kaspars rhost= user=kaspars
Oct 3 08:21:03 zabbix42 sudo: kaspars : user NOT in sudoers ; TTY=pts/3 ; PWD=/home/kaspars ; USER=root ; COMMAND=/bin/su
Oct 3 08:21:05 zabbix42 sudo: pam_unix(sudo:auth): authentication failure; logname=kaspars uid=1000 euid=0 tty=/dev/pts/3 ruser=kaspars rhost= user=kaspars
Oct 3 08:21:09 zabbix42 sudo: kaspars : user NOT in sudoers ; TTY=pts/3 ; PWD=/home/kaspars ; USER=root ; COMMAND=/bin/su
Oct 3 08:23:09 zabbix42 sudo: kaspars : user NOT in sudoers ; TTY=pts/3 ; PWD=/home/kaspars ; USER=root ; COMMAND=/bin/su
Oct 3 08:26:59 zabbix42 sudo: kaspars : user NOT in sudoers ; TTY=pts/3 ; PWD=/home/kaspars ; USER=root ; COMMAND=/bin/su
```



MASTER LOG ITEM

Master item contains all important log information

Item	Preprocessing		
	* Name	secure log	
	Туре	Zabbix agent (active) ▼	
	* Key	log["/var/log/secure"]	Select
	Type of information	Log ▼	
	* Update interval	1s	
	* History storage period	Do not keep history Storage period 90d	
	Log time format		
	New application	security	
	Applications	-None-	



DEPENDENT LOG ITEMS

Dependent items extract information from the main log

Item Preprocessing	
* Name sudo failed	
Type Dependent item ▼	
* Key sudo.fail	Select
* Master item Zabbix42: secure log 🗶	Select
Type of information Log ▼	
* History storage period	iod 90d
Item Preprocessing	
Preprocessing steps Name Par	rameters Custom on fail
1: Regular expression ▼ (.+	+user NOT in sudoers.+)
Custom on fail Discard value Set val	lue to Set error to
Add	
Update Clone Check now Cle	ear history and trends Delete Cancel

DEPENDENT LOG ITEMS

Wizard	Name ▲	Triggers	Key	Interval	History	Trends	Туре
***	secure log: login failed	Triggers 2	root.login.failed		90d		Dependent item
***	secure log: login suceeded		root.login.success		90d		Dependent item
***	secure log		log["/var/log/secure"]	1s	90d		Zabbix agent (active)
***	secure log: sudo failed	Triggers 1	sudo.fail		90d		Dependent item

▼	Name ▲	Interval	History	Trends	Туре	Last check	Last value	(
▼ Zabbix42	- other - (4 Items)							
	login failed root.login.failed		90d		Dependent item	2019-10-03 08:20:23	Failed password for kaspar	
	login suceeded root.login.success		90d		Dependent item	2019-10-03 08:20:55	Accepted password for kas	
	secure log log["/var/log/secure"]	1s	90d		Zabbix agent	2019-10-03 08:43:10	Oct 3 08:43:09 zabbix42 su	
	sudo failed sudo.fail		90d		Dependent item	2019-10-03 08:43:10	Oct 3 08:43:09 zabbix42 su	



GATHERING USEFULL INFORMATION

Information can be extracted from the logs using function **regsub** (<pattern>,<output>)

Extracted information can be used in







LOG TRIGGERS

```
Log line:
```

```
sudo: kaspars : user NOT in sudoers ; TTY=pts/3 ; PWD=/home/kaspars ; USER=zabbix ; COMMAND=/bin/ping
```

```
Examples to extract user and executed command {{ITEM.VALUE}.regsub("sudo: (.+):", user: \1)} {{ITEM.VALUE}.regsub("COMMAND=(.+)", command: \1)}
```




LOG BASED TRIGGER EXAMPLE

Trigger	Tags	Dependencies							
		* Name	Sudo attempt without permissions {{ITEM.VALUE}.regsub("sudo: (.+):", user: \1)} {{						K
		Severity	Not classified	Information	Warning	Average	High	Disaster	
		* Expression	{Zabbix42:sudo.fail.str(user NOT in sudoers)}=1						Add
									//
			Expression const	ructor					
	Ok	event generation	Expression	Recovery expre	ssion No	ne			
PROBLE	M even	t generation mode	Single Mult	iple					
	А	llow manual close	✓						
		URL							



USE TAGS TO FILTER INFORMATON!







CAN WE MONITOR WINDOWS LOGS?

Yes, a special key **eventlog** can be used

You can filter event logs by

- Source (Security, System etc...)
- Severity ("Warning", "Error", "Critical" etc...)
- **Eventid**


4625 - Logon Failure

4740 - A user account was locked out)





ZABBIX INTEGRATION





THANK YOU!



Kaspars Mednis

ZABBIX Technical Support Engineer











zabbix